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Economists have invested a great deal of effort in trying to understand the motivation for family
transfers, yet recent empirical work testing the seemingly appealing models of altruism and
exchange has led to decidedly mixed results.  A major stumbling block has been the lack of adequate
data.  We take a fresh look at the issue using responses to an innovative survey question that directly
asks mother about the planned division of their estates.  We find that both altruism and exchange
are frequently offered as explanations of behavior and are of nearly equal importance.  Furthermore,
the explanations are consistent with observable characteristics of the mother, lending support to the
validity of the question.  We also find that among step or adopted families, genetic ties play an
important role.  Because motivating factors appear to differ across families the lack of a consensus
among previous researchers about motives ought not to be surprising.
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Parents often appear to “play favorites” when distributing financial resources among their adult children. 
Recent studies indicate in any given year, approximately 75% of parents who make inter vivos transfers to 
their children, give unequal amounts. Even when making bequests—where equal division is the norm—as 
many as 20% of parents treat their children unequally.
1  This evidence is consistent with a number of 
models of optimizing behavior, each of which predicts parents will favor certain children in allocating 
resources.  The altruism model (Barro, 1974; Becker, 1974; Becker and Tomes, 1979) assumes parents 
want to equalize marginal utilities across family members—a goal they achieve by giving the largest 
transfers to their least well-off children.  The exchange model (Bernheim, Shleifer and Summers, 1985; 
Cox, 1987; Cox and Rank, 1992) assumes parental transfers are payments for such child-provided 
services as affection and household help; because the price of these services varies with child income, the 
model predicts an unequal distribution of transfers. Cox (in press) argues that parents may make transfers 
to promote the survival of their genes. If parents are driven by evolutionary motives, they should favor 
biological children over adopted and step children, and they should give more to children who produce 
(or are likely to produce) grandchildren.   
Efforts to determine which motive dominates parental decisions to treat their children unequally 
have met with decidedly mixed results (e.g., Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotlikoff, 1992, 1997; Perozek, 1998).  
Moreover, all three theoretical models fail decisively when faced with the prevalence of equal bequests. 
This gap between theory and evidence has prompted researchers to develop alternative models that justify 
the equal distribution of transfers (Andreoni, 1989) or explain why parents differentiate among their 
children with inter vivos transfers but not bequests (Bernheim and Severinov, 2000; McGarry, 1999; 
Wilhelm, 1996).   
While these additional theoretical insights may prove useful, it is apparent that richer data are 
needed as well. Tests of the altruism, exchange, and evolutionary models would gain considerable power 
if data were available on lifetime incomes and transfers.  Parents may alter their patterns of giving over 
time if, for example, their children’s economic circumstances change or if there is “lumpiness” in the flow 
of transfers.  Such intertemporal fluctuations may be consistent with the standard models, yet they could 
lead researchers to misinterpret parental motives when examining cross-sectional snapshots of transfer 
allocations.  It is unlikely that we will ever succeed in measuring cumulative, lifetime transfers, but the 
                                                 
1The transfer figure is from an analysis of data from the Asset and Health Dynamic Study reported in McGarry and 
Schoeni (1997).  Using the same data source, McGarry (1999) finds that 17% of parents aged 70 and over who name 
children in a will intend to divide their estates unequally. Using federal estate tax data, Wilhelm (1996) finds that 
23% of estates are divided unequally, meaning not all children receive a bequest within 2% of the family mean.       3
advent of panel data on parent-to-child transfers presents one promising, new avenue for empirical 
research (Hochguertel and Ohlsson, 2000; McGarry, 2000).   
An alternative approach is to collect new and different data that will allow researchers to tease 
uncover motives with cross-sectional observations. In the current study, we take the latter approach and 
draw on newly available donor-reported explanations for the allocation of transfers.  In 1999, respondents 
in the National Longitudinal Surveys (NLS) of Young Women and Mature Women reported detailed 
information about each of their children, recent transfers between themselves and their children, and their 
intended bequests.  One feature of the data is particularly novel: mothers who report that they intend to 
divide their estates unequally among their children were asked to explain the reason for their intentions.   
While only 8% of mothers fall into the “unequal bequests” category, their verbatim responses are the first 
direct evidence of parental motives for allocating resources among their children.
2 
In analyzing these NLS data, we begin by asking whether mothers’ self-reported explanations for 
intended unequal bequests conform to the ideas of altruism, exchange, and evolution.  That is, we look for 
responses along the lines of  “I plan to give more to my poor children,” “I plan to give more to the child 
who takes care of me,” and “I plan to favor my biological children.”  Remarkably, the majority of 
verbatim responses fit reasonably neatly into one of these three categories.  Among mothers who intend to 
divide their estates unequally, 25% provide an explanation that conforms to altruistic behavior, 25% give 
an exchange-related response, and 10% refer to the biological status of their children.  The remaining 
mothers are evenly divided between those who, based on their explanation, appear to intend an equal 
division of their estate (and who may have misunderstood the question), and those who give a “non-
explanation” (e.g., “It’s nobody’s business why”).  No mother provides an explicit explanation that fails 
to conform to motives of altruism, exchange, or evolution. 
We also find that mothers’ observed characteristics are correlated with their bequest intentions in 
a manner largely consistent with all three competing theories.  The probability that a mother intends 
unequal bequests is significantly higher if she is in poor health (which may reflect her need for children’s 
“services” and willingness to pay), if she has nonbiological children, and if her children’s predicted 
incomes are especially different from each other (which suggests she intends to favor the least affluent).   
Moreover, these observable proxies for altruistic, exchange, and evolutionary motives prove to be 
correlated with the self-reported explanations.  We find that mothers in poor health are more likely than 
                                                 
2 Although economists have traditionally been skeptical about the usefulness of self-reported explanations, a 
growing body of research is finding that they can provide important insights not obtainable with standard methods 
(c.f. Manski, 1990; Laitner and Juster, 1996; Dominitz, 1998; Hurd and McGarry, 2002). Basset and Lumsdaine 
(2003) cite the growing list of surveys collecting expectations data as evidence of a “resurgent interest” in these   4
other mothers to provide an exchange-related explanation for their intended unequal bequests.  Similarly, 
mothers with nonbiological children often refer to their children’s biological status in explaining their 
intended bequests.  We find only one anomalous pattern in the data, in that mothers whose children’s 
predicted incomes differ greatly are not more likely than others to give an altruism-related explanation. 
Finally, we compare mothers’ intended bequest allocations with their actual patterns of inter vivos 
transfers to see if the same motives might drive both forms of giving.  The data reveal that 77% of 
mothers who intend to make equal bequests, distribute inter vivos transfers unequally among their 
children.  While relatively few mothers intend to make unequal bequests, these mothers are more likely 
than others to make equal inter vivos transfers; this negative correlation between unequal bequests and 
unequal transfers holds unconditionally, and it holds in a multivariate model of the probability of unequal 
transfers.  In short, there is a pronounced tendency for mothers to treat their children equally at one point 
in their lives and unequally at another. 
Our results suggest that motives for intra-family transfers differ across mothers.  Altruism, 
exchange, and a preference for biological children—which, as we argue below, may reflect altruism or 
exchange as much as genetic links—all appear to be empirically important reasons for distributing 
resources unequally among children.  We also find that motives vary over time for most mothers so that 
patterns of giving during life may differ from those for bequests.  In light of these findings, we are not 
surprised that researchers have failed to form a consensus in support of a single theoretical model.   
In the next section, we provide additional details on the alternative models of intra-family 
transfers and previous efforts to distinguish between them.  In section 3 we describe the data. In section 4 
we analyze the intended bequest decisions of the mothers in our sample.  We model the probability that 
mothers intend to divide their estates unequally among their children, and we analyze their self-reported 
explanations for unequal bequests to shed additional light on the motives behind their intentions.  In 
section 5 we compare the intended division of bequests with the actual division of inter vivos transfers to 
determine whether mothers’ transfer behavior is intertemporally consistent.  We offer concluding 
comments in section 6. 
2. Background  
The three competing motives that we explore—altruism, exchange, and evolution—offer distinct 
explanations for why parents distinguish among their children in making transfers.  The goal of our 
empirical analysis is to learn the extent to which allocation decisions reported by mothers in the NLS 
                                                                                                                                                             
types of data (page 2).  We view the data analyzed here as an important supplement to reports on actual giving that 
have been analyzed in the past.    5
conform to the alternative explanations.  We begin our discussion with an overview of each model and a 
summary of the existing empirical evidence on patterns of intra-family transfers. 
The altruism model (Becker, 1974; Barro, 1974; Becker and Tomes, 1979) assumes a parent 
obtains utility from her own consumption  ) ( p C and the utility level of each child k  )) ( ( k C V .  Assuming 
a two-child family for simplicity (k=1,2), the parental utility function takes the form 
)). ( ), ( , ( 2 1 C V C V C U U p p =  The parent must decide how to allocate resources between her own 
consumption and each child’s consumption.  At the optimal interior solution, the marginal utility of a 
dollar transferred to each child and the marginal utility of a dollar spent on own consumption are all 
equal. Because the marginal utility of a transfer depends on the child’s pre-transfer income, a key 
prediction of the model is that child income is negatively correlated with parent-to-child transfer amounts.    
In the exchange model (Bernheim, Shleifer and Summers, 1985; Cox and Rank, 1992) the 
parental utility function is  ), , ( S C U U p p =  where S represents services provide by the children. 
Services can be actual care and assistance, attention paid to the parent, or even behavior that is valued by 
the parent.  Parents must pay for these services and because the price depends on the value of the child’s 
time, the parent is more likely to purchase services from a low-income child because the cost of that 
child’s time is relatively low.  The exchange model thus predicts that the probability of a parent-to-child 
transfer is negatively related to child income. However, the model makes no prediction about the 
correlation between transfer amounts  and child income.  The parent is expected to purchase fewer 
services at a higher “per unit” price from her high-income child; the total cost of those services (which is 
the transfer amount) depends on price elasticities of child-specific supply and parent-specific demand for 
child services. 
Cox (in press) argues that transfers may arise from an innate desire to aid the survival of ones’ 
genes.  As a result, adopted children and stepchildren should receive less than biological children. 
Evolutionary theory also predicts that the sex of both parent and child may play a role. Because a mother 
is always certain that a child she gave birth to is her biological child, she will be willing to transfer 
resources to the child. A father, however, might harbor doubt about his genetic relationship to the child 
and be less generous. Similarly, a parent might give more generously to a daughter than to a son because 
the daughter’s offspring are certain to be genetic descendents.  Whether parents favor children with 
(biological) children of their own when allocating resources is less clear. On one hand, parents may 
reward children who have already produced genetic heirs.  On the other hand, they may give relatively   6
large amounts to childless children to assist with the eventual cost of raising a child or simply to 
“motivate” them to produce grandchildren (Cox and Stark, 1999).  
From an empirical standpoint, it is exceedingly difficult to distinguish between these competing 
models.  For example, a parent who favors her biological children in allocating resources may be driven 
by an evolutionary motive or she may be behaving altruistically if her stepchildren or adopted children 
receive transfers from their birth parents.
3  Alternatively, an exchange-motivated parent may give more to 
her biological children if they provide services more efficiently than nonbiological children, perhaps 
because they have known her longer and are more familiar with her preferences.  Similarly, parents may 
favor daughters not because of an evolutionary motive, but because daughters provide services at a lower 
cost than do sons.
4 The exchange model is particularly difficult to reject as an explanation for behavior 
because it is consistent with either a positive or negative relationship between transfer amounts and 
children’s income, and because transfers need not coincide temporally with the provision of purchased 
service. 
Given the inherent difficulty of distinguishing between models, it is unsurprising that the 
empirical literature has been unable to find consistent support for any particular hypothesis.  Much of the 
difficulty reflects the lack of high-quality data and corresponding shortage of rigorous tests of alternative 
hypotheses.  For example, several analysts use probate records and other specialized sources to examine 
the actual division of deceased parents’ estates (Menchik 1980, 1988; Tomes, 1981, 1988; Wilhelm, 
1996), but questions arise about the applicability of their findings to the general population.  Studies of 
estate division also typically lack information on inter vivos giving, while studies of inter vivos transfers 
lack data on the division of the eventual estate.
5  
Despite data limitations, two empirical regularities have emerged.  First, inter vivos transfers 
generally prove to be negatively related to children’s income (Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotlikoff, 1997; Cox 
and Rank, 1992; Dunn and Phillips, 1997; Hochguertel and Ohlsson, 2000; McGarry and Schoeni, 1995, 
1997); this evidence is consistent with both the altruism and exchange models.  Second, most data sources 
suggest that estates are divided equally among children in the overwhelming majority of cases (Dunn and 
                                                 
3 The well-being of the children can be viewed as a public good, with both the mother and step-mother choosing 
how much to transfer to the child. Schoeni (2001) investigates such behavior in a similar context, where young 
married couples receive support from two sets of parents.      
4 Coward and Dwyer (1990) and Stoller, Forster, and Duniho (1992), among others, find that daughters are more 
likely than sons to care for their parents. 
5 An advantage of our study is that we have data for the actual division of inter vivos transfers as well as intended 
bequests.  The same is true of Dunn and Phillips (1997) and McGarry (1999), both of which use data from the Asset 
and Health Dynamics Study.     7
Phillips, 1997; McGarry, 1999; Menchik, 1980, 1988; Wilhelm, 1996).
6  These patterns are difficult to 
reconcile with the models described above, and suggest that single, point-in-time observations on parental 
giving invariably fail to tell the entire story. Because ideal data on lifetime transfers and incomes are 
unavailable (and, in all likelihood, will never become available), we turn instead to parents’ self-reported 
descriptions of their motives for giving.  
3.  Data 
3.1 Samples 
Our data are from the National Longitudinal Surveys of Mature Women and Young Women. The NLS of 
Mature Women began in 1967 with a sample of 5,083 women born in 1922-37. The Young Women 
survey began in 1968 with a sample of 5,159 women born in 1943-53.  Each original sample is 
representative of the civilian, non-institutionalized population of women who lived in the U.S. when the 
survey began and who belonged to the relevant birth cohorts; each sample also includes an over-sample of 
black women. 
We use data from the 1999 interview because an extensive module on transfers between 
respondents and their children was fielded that year. Respondents were asked detailed questions about the 
characteristics of each of their children, money and time transfers to and from each child, and their 
intended bequests.   We have identical information for Young Woman and Mature Woman respondents so 
we pool the two cohorts for our entire analysis.
7  By this point in the survey, attrition reduced the sample 
to 2,467 Mature Women respondents and 2,900 Young Women respondents.  
We construct two different samples to analyze mothers’ division of bequests and inter vivos 
transfers among their children; our selection criteria are detailed in appendix table A. From the 5,367 
Mature Women and Young Women respondents interviewed in 1999, we begin by selecting 3,491 women 
with at least two children age 18 or over. Next, we exclude 1,682 mothers who report having no will, 111 
for whom the existence of a will is unknown, and another 60 who exclude their children from their will. 
Our goal is to keep only those mothers whose preferences regarding estate division are known.  We 
eliminate mothers who exclude children from their will because it is unclear if they intend to divide 
resources equally by giving nothing to each child, or if they would prefer unequal division involving 
                                                 
6 Laitner and Ohlsson (2001) and Tomes (1981, 1988) present evidence that estates are divided unequally among 
children, although Tomes’s findings have been refuted by  Menchik (1988).   
7 From 1995 onward, the same survey instrument was used for the two cohorts and the fielding effort was conducted 
simultaneously.  The 1999 interview is the 19
th for the Mature Women and 20
th for the Young Women.   8
negative transfers.  Similarly, we eliminate women without wills because their intentions are ambiguous.
8  
Finally, we eliminate 20 mothers who do not indicate whether they intend to divide their estate equally 
among their children.  The 1,618 remaining mothers form our “bequest sample.”  
We are forced to pare the sample down further to analyze the distribution of inter vivos transfers.  
While all respondents with children are asked about their intended bequests, only a subset are asked about 
transfers to children in the last year.
9 Among the 1,618 women in our bequest sample, 452 do not report 
inter vivos transfer information for any of their children.  We eliminate another 311 women who reveal 
that they made no transfers (of cash, loans, gifts, or financial assistance) to any of their children in the last 
year.  As with bequests, it is unclear whether these mothers prefer to treat their children equally, or 
whether they prefer an unequal division of negative (child-to-mother) transfers.
10  These additional 
selection rules produce a “transfers sample” of 855 mothers. 
3.2  Explanatory variables  
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the explanatory variables used to model the probabilities of unequal 
bequests and unequal inter vivos transfers.  We summarize these variables for the bequest and transfers 
samples, as well as for a sample of all women with at least two adult children.  We use this larger sample 
as a benchmark to judge the characteristics along which the bequest and transfers samples are selected.  
Our model includes measures of annual family income, total assets, home ownership, and 
mothers’ highest grade completed.  These variables include husbands’ resources, where applicable, and 
are intended to control for heterogeneity in the resources available for transfer.   We also include 
standard, demographic controls for mothers’ age, race, and marital status.  To investigate exchange 
motives for mother-to-child transfers, we control for each mother’s self-reported health status and 
whether she receives help from any of her children.  The “poor/fair health” indicator equals one for 
women who report that compared to other women their age, their health is in the bottom two of four 
                                                 
8 In principle, mothers who wish to divide their estate equally among their children may intentionally forego writing 
a will because they expect state law to mandate an equal division.  Rather than make that assumption, we opt to 
eliminate respondents without a will.   
9 To reduce respondent burden, women with no coresident children and more than five non-coresident children are 
not asked child-specific transfers questions The remaining mothers answer child-specific questions for up to five of 
their children; those with more than five children answer the questions for their coresident children only.  The child 
count includes biological, adopted, and step children who are age 19 or older (or age 14-18 and married or with 
children), and who are named by the mother during a child enumeration conducted at the start of the transfers 
portion of the 1999 interview.    
10 We have data on child-to-mother transfers, but they do not necessarily reflect mothers’ desired (negative) transfers 
because mothers cannot always extract as much as they wish from their children.  We assume mothers who give 
unequally to their children attain their desired (unequal) distribution, even if they are constrained in the amounts 
transferred.    9
categories (poor, fair, good, excellent).  The “receives help” variable equals one for women who report 
receiving help with personal care, household chores, or errands from any of their children during the last 
year. 
The remaining variables measure the characteristics of each woman’s children—especially the 
differences in children’s circumstances that are likely to be related to mothers’ unequal transfer 
allocations. We control for the total number of children as well as the sex composition (whether she has 
both boys and girls) because the evolutionary model predicts greater transfers to daughters due to the 
more certain genetic ties. Furthermore, previous research consistently reveals that daughters are more 
likely than sons to provide care, so the “mixed sex” indicator may also reveal patterns consistent with 
exchange models. In light of the evolutionary model’s prediction that parents distinguish between 
biological, adopted, and step children in allocating resources, we include these child characteristics as 
well.  We also control for whether the woman has coresident children (who may be needier than others 
and/or provide services to the mother) and whether her children are “mixed” in having children of their 
own (i.e., whether some, as opposed to all or none, of her children have children). 
In light of the altruism model’s prediction that parents make larger transfers to relatively low-
income children, it is important that we include a measure of child well-being.  NLS respondents are not 
asked to report their children’s income directly, so we construct a measure of predicted income based on 
observable characteristics.  We believe predicted income is a better control than current income because 
intended bequests are likely to be determined with a long-term, “smoothed” view of children’s relative 
needs.  We predict each child’s family income using estimated parameters from income models that we fit 
to data from the 2000 annual demographic (March) supplement of the Current Population Survey.
11 After 
predicting the income of each child we compute the coefficient of variation for each woman, which is the 
within-family standard deviation as a percent of the within-family mean.   
Table 1 reveals that among mothers in the bequest sample, the average age is 62 (the range is 45-
80), 70% are married, 18% are widowed, and 12% are divorced.
12  Relative to the benchmark sample of 
all women with at least two children, women in the bequest sample are better off financially:  their 
average income is $41,300 (vs. $35,820 in the full sample), the average value of their bequeathable assets, 
                                                 
11Our sample consists of all CPS respondents in the same age range as the children of our NLS mothers.  We 
estimate separate income models for men and women using as regressors a constant, a quartic in age, seven dummy 
variables indicating schooling attainment (degrees earned), and dummy variables indicating race, marital status, 
number of children, whether the individual resides with his/her parents (or spouse’s parents), and whether the 
individual owns a home. 
12 Only six mothers in the bequest sample and three in the transfers sample are never married.  We combine them 
with the married women throughout our analysis; our estimates are invariant to how we treat these cases.    10
including housing, is $332,100 (vs. $225,500) and 92% own a home (vs. 81%).  They are more likely to 
be white (89% vs. 76%) and married (70% vs. 62%), slightly less likely to be in poor health (20% vs. 
27%), and they have slightly fewer children.  These patterns suggest that mothers who have a will—and 
who, therefore, appear in the bequest sample—have more resources to distribute to their children than do 
mothers in general. 
The right-most columns in table 1 report the summary statistics for the smaller sample of women 
who made transfers to their children in the last year. Not surprisingly, women actively making inter vivos 
transfers have somewhat greater income and asset levels than do the larger samples of women.  They also 
have slightly fewer children than women in the bequest sample (3.1 vs. 3.4), which reflects the fact that 
most mothers with more than five children are excluded from our transfers sample because of the survey 
design (see section 3.1). 
4. Intended bequests 
We begin our analysis by modeling the probability that mothers intend to make unequal bequests to their 
children. In section 4.1, we use as our “unequal bequest” indicator each woman’s direct response to the 
question, “Will your estate be divided equally among your children?”
13  Among the 1,618 mothers in our 
bequest sample, 1,490 (92.1%) say “yes” and the remaining 128 say “no.”  We model the probability of 
answering “no” as a function of the explanatory variables defined in the proceeding section.  This 
exercise reveals whether observed characteristics that are consistent with exchange motives (e.g., poor 
health), altruism motives (e.g., a high coefficient of variation of children’s income) and evolutionary 
motives (e.g., having both biological and nonbiological children) are correlated with women’s intentions 
to divide their estate unequally.  
In section 4.2, we make use of verbatim responses to the question, “Why will your estate not be 
divided equally among your children?”  This question is asked of the 128 mothers who answer “no” to the 
equal/unequal question given in the proceeding paragraph.  We use the stated reasons to experiment with 
alternative definitions of “unequal.” In addition, we assess the extent to which women’s reasons are 
consistent with exchange, altruism, and evolutionary motives.  
4.1 Probability of equal bequests   
Table 2 presents logit estimates of the probability that mothers intend to distribute their estates unequally 
among their children, based on “yes/no” responses to the initial question about estate division.   
                                                 
13 For married respondents who report that they are leaving everything to their husband, the phrase “if your husband 
dies before you or with you” is added to the question.    11
Statistically significant effects are identified with boldface type. The estimates reveal that the probability 
of intending unequal bequests does not differ by financial status. The estimated coefficients for both 
income and wealth are statistically indistinguishable from zero. Similarly, the coefficients for indicators 
of home ownership and mother’s schooling levels are estimated very imprecisely.  Instead of financial 
characteristics, factors relating to health and child characteristics are important.   
Our indicator of poor maternal health plays an important role. Being in fair or poor health is 
associated with a two percentage point increase in the probability of unequal intended division for 
mothers with mean values of all other characteristics. Because only 8% of the sample intends to make 
unequal bequests, this two percentage point change is equal to a 25% change in the predicted outcome.  , 
In contrast, the “receives care” variable does not have a significant effect.
14   Unlike the “receives care” 
variable, which refers to exchanges made in the past year, the poor health indicator may reflect mothers’ 
long-term need for child assistance.  If so, our findings suggest that mothers use intended, future 
transfers—which, presumably, they make known to their children—to elicit a long-term flow of services 
rather than current, short-term care.  This type of behavior is predicted by Bernheim, Shleifer and 
Summers (1985), who emphasize the strategic use of bequests to influence child behavior over the 
remainder of the parent’s life.   
Table 2 also provides evidence that altruism may play a role in transfer decisions, in that larger 
within-family variation in children’s income is associated with a higher probability of unequal intended 
bequests. Consider a two-child family in which one child’s income is $25,000 and the other’s income is 
$50,000. The coefficient of variation for this family is 47 (i.e., the standard deviation is 47% of the mean).  
If this hypothetical mother is “average” in all other respects, our estimates predict that her probability of 
intending unequal bequests is 4.7 percentage points higher than it would be if her children had the same 
income—an increase of nearly 60%.  This finding is consistent with altruistic behavior if we assume that 
she intends to give more to the low-income child.   Of course, the result is also consistent with the 
exchange model if the mother intends to give more to the low-income child (for whom the price of time is 
also low) as payment for time-intensive services.   
We find that mothers with only biological children (the omitted category) are significantly less 
likely to plan unequal bequests than are those with either adopted children or stepchildren. Having at least 
one stepchild increases the probability of intended unequal treatment by 4.1 percentage points, or over 
50%.  The presence of an adopted child is associated with a similar, 3.8 percentage point increase.  (The 
                                                 
14 Care received includes help with personal care, household chores, and errands.  If we limit the measure to 
personal care, the results remain virtually unchanged.   12
difference between these two estimates is statistically insignificant.) Clearly, mothers with nonbiological 
children exhibit strikingly different behavior than do mothers with only biological children.   
The final covariate for which we estimate a statistically significant coefficient is the dummy 
variable indicating that some of the mother’s children have children of their own.  The omitted group 
consists of mothers with no grandchildren and those for whom all children have children of their own.  
The positive estimate shown in table 2 reveals that mothers with children who are “mixed” in this regard 
are more likely to intend unequal bequests.  We do not know that they will bequeath more to those 
children with children of their own, but such intentions would be consistent with altruistic behavior 
(insofar as families with children have the greatest financial need), exchange motives (if grandchildren 
supply affection and other “services”) or evolutionary motives (given that biological grandchildren will 
carry on the family genes).  
The logit estimates in table 2 do not constitute a formal test of any theory, but they provide 
descriptive evidence that all three competing models—altruism, exchange, and evolution—may play a 
role in intra-family transfer decisions.  We cannot conclude with certainty that mothers in poor health are 
driven by exchange motives to divide their estates unequally among their children, nor do we know 
whether women whose children’s incomes vary considerably are behaving altruistically or that mothers 
with nonbiological children are driven by evolutionary motives.  In fact, as we have noted, each pattern is 
consistent with more than one model.  To address this issue directly, we examine the reasons given by 
these mothers for intending unequal bequests to learn more about their motives. 
4.2. Self-reported reasons for intended unequal bequests  
As explained at the outset of section 4, mothers who report that they intend to divide their estates 
unequally are asked to explain why.  The interviewer records their actual responses, so we have the 
mothers’ own words rather than their selections from a list of possible responses.  The explanations 
should thus be free from suggestion bias. 
Table 3 gives examples of the verbatim responses and a summary of our efforts to classify them 
as reflecting exchange, altruism, or evolutionary motives. The vast majority of responses fit neatly into 
one of these categories.  Among the 128 mothers providing a response, 22 refer to their children’s 
financial needs in explaining why some will receive a larger bequest than others (e.g., “the oldest son has 
more assets than the youngest son.”).  These mothers’ motives clearly conform to the altruism model. We 
include an additional 11 mothers who mention a child’s disability (e.g., “my daughter can’t have over 
$2000 or she will lose her state benefits”) in this category as well.  We classify 33 responses under   13
“exchange” because the mother refers to care-giving or attention provided by the child (e.g. “she takes 
care of me”) or indicates that a child has displeased the parents (e.g. “because we are estranged from our 
daughter.”)  Another 13 responses directly refer to the child(ren)’s status as biological, adopted, or step.  
We classify these responses as “evolutionary,” although they can also reflect altruism (because the mother 
might expect the child’s other (birth) parent to provide for him/her) or exchange (if, for example, the 
mother interacts less extensively with her stepchildren than with her biological children).     
Finally, we determine that another 25 mothers may not belong in the “unequal” sample at all.  
Despite initially reporting that their wills do not call for equal division of their estates, eight mothers 
provide an explanation indicating that, in fact, an equal division is intended.  Typically the confusion 
arises when the children are beneficiaries only if the husband predeceases his wife (e.g. “My husband first 
and then my children.”).   Another 13 mothers explain that other people (including grandchildren) are 
beneficiaries as well as their children; these women apparently intend to treat their children equally while 
giving them less than 100% of their estates (e.g. “It will be divided equally between XXX and my 
children.”).  Four mothers indicate that they intend to leave more for a minor child (e.g., to allow him/her 
to finish school), but they are likely to change their wills as their children age.  Below, we assess the 
sensitivity of our logit estimates to alternative definitions of  “unequal” based on these verbatim 
responses. 
We leave the remaining 24 cases unclassified. One of these remaining respondents provides a 
long, detailed explanation that we cannot interpret, but the remaining 23 cases fall under the heading of 
“non-answers.”  A few women decline to provide a reason (one respondent tells the interview “that’s a 
terrible question”), while others describe their intended distribution without explanation (e.g., “just one 
son gets it all.”)   
Our classification scheme requires some assumptions on our part, but we check responses against 
other data (e.g., the number, sex composition, and biological status of the children) to ensure that we are 
not misinterpreting respondents’ remarks.   Despite an inevitable level of ambiguity, we believe the 
verbatim responses are noteworthy for several reasons.  First, 79 out of 128 mothers (62%) give 
explanations that clearly suggest they are driven by exchange, altruism, and/or evolutionary motives; no 
mother explicitly describes motives that are inconsistent with these competing theoretical models.     
Second, mothers appear to be equally likely to be driven by altruism and exchange motives.  We place 33 
responses into each category, but even if we eliminate or reclassify the most ambiguous cases (such as 
those where the mother intends to favor the child who will serve as executor of the will) the breakdown 
between altruism and exchange is roughly equal.  Third, mothers with a disabled or institutionalized child   14
form a large share of the cases classified as altruism.  Just as the altruism model predicts, families whose 
children differ dramatically in their innate abilities or outcomes have a strong incentive to differentiate 
among their children in transferring resources.
15 
Our next step is to reanalyze the probability of intended unequal bequests, using the verbatim 
responses to construct alternative definitions of unequal giving.  The dependent variable used for the table 
2 logit is based on answers to the question, “Will your estate be divided equally among your children?”  
Among the 128 women who answer “no,” our interpretation of their reasons suggests that as many as 25 
actually intend to make equal bequests (table 3).  Our first alternative definition of unequal shifts all 25 
from the unequal category to the equal category.  Definition 2 shifts only 14 of those 25 cases to the equal 
category; mothers who intend to include grandchildren or favor minor children in their wills continue to 
be classified as “unequal.”  
We reestimate the logistic regression reported in table 2 for the two alternative definitions of 
inequality.  The results are reported in table 4.  In general, the coefficient estimates differ only slightly 
from table 2 and the main points continue to hold:  using definitions 1 and 2, measures of the mother’s 
financial status continue to have virtually no effect on the probability of intending unequal bequests, 
while stepchildren, adopted children, “some children having children” and variation in children’s income 
are associated with higher probabilities of intended unequal bequests.  The estimated coefficient for 
“poor/fair health” was significantly different from zero in table 2, but with both new definitions the point 
estimate decreases slightly while the standard error decreases.  At the same time, the estimated coefficient 
for the “age 75+” dummy variable is estimated more precisely when we use definition 1 than in the other 
two specifications.  Mothers’ health status and age are highly correlated, of course, so it is unsurprising 
that slight changes in the sample affect the relative precision with which we identify their effects.
16  In 
short, we find no dramatic changes in the correlates of intended unequal bequests when we use mothers’ 
self-reported reasons to determine whether they really intend to treat their children unequally. 
                                                 
15 The example in table 3 reflects classic altruistic behavior:  the mother is saying that once a $2000 cap is reached, 
the marginal utility of a dollar given to her disabled child is zero because it “crowds out” public benefits.  At the 
same time, this behavior contradicts the key, testable prediction of the altruistic model, which is that children with 
the lowest income (including, presumably, most disabled children) receive the largest transfer. This example, and 
others like it, highlight the potential gains from looking beyond observed behavior.  
16 The estimated coefficients for the “divorced” and “highest grade completed=16+” dummies also become 
statistically significant (at a 10% level) when we use definition 1.  Divorced (as well as widowed) mothers may be 
more likely than married women to need help from their children.  More highly schooled mothers may understand 
the intricacies of using trusts to make unequal transfers better than do their less schooled counterparts.  Because 
trusts avoid probate and, therefore, public disclosure of the details, parents may be more likely to make unequal 
bequests in this fashion.   15
We have shown how characteristics of mothers and their children relate to the probability of 
intending unequal bequests, and we have examined mothers’ self-reported reasons for their intentions.  
We now ask how these characteristics and reported reasons relate to each other.   If “poor health” and 
“receives help from children” are proxies for exchange motives, we expect the reasons reported by 
women with these characteristics to fall into the exchange category more often than not.  Similarly, 
women whose children’s incomes vary considerably should report altruism-related reasons and women 
with nonbiological children should be the only ones whose reasons suggest they are favoring biological 
children.     
In table 5, we show how the reported frequency of alternative explanations—altruism, exchange, 
evolutionary, or unclassified—varies by selected observed characteristics.
17  The table reveals that among 
older mothers (age 75+) who intend to divide their estate unequally, 23% give a reason that is consistent 
with altruism, 38% cite exchange, 15% refer to the biological status of their children, and 23% give a 
reason that we cannot classify.  In comparison, a larger percentage (33%) of their younger counterparts 
give a reason related to altruism while fewer of them (31%) give an exchange motive.  Similarly, mothers 
in “fair or poor” health are much less likely to provide an altruism-related reason than to provide an 
exchange-related reason (21% vs. 45%), while the opposite is true for mothers in better health.  The same 
pattern is seen when we compare mothers who receive care from their children to mothers who do not.  
Because we are working with such small samples, chi-squared test statistics reveal that the difference in 
each pair of distributions is statistically significant at a 10% level only for the breakdown by “receives 
care” (a result that is due to a large difference in the fraction reporting an evolutionary explanation).  
Nonetheless, the data suggest that mothers whose characteristics suggest they might need care from their 
children are the most likely to cite exchange-related motives for intending unequal bequests.    
The most striking contrasts in table 5 are related to the biological status of the children. Among 
mothers with only biological children, 44% report an altruistic reason, 34% report a reason related to 
exchange and, of course, none indicate that they intend to favor their biological children with their 
bequests. In contrast, only 9% of mothers with step or adopted children report an altruistic reason, while 
29% report an exchange motive and 37% report an evolutionary motive. A chi-squared test reveals the 
difference between these two distributions to be highly significant. We find similarly, statistically 
significant differences between small and large families.  Women with relatively few children are far 
more likely than their counterparts to report a reason related to altruism (36% vs. 18%) and far less likely 
                                                 
17 We use the sample of 103 women who intend unequal bequests according to definition 1, but our results are the 
same if we use all 128 “unequal” mothers in the table 2 sample.  
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to report an evolutionary reason (9% vs. 27%).  Mothers with many children are more likely to have at 
least one nonbiological child, at least one child in difficult financial straits (altruism), and at least one 
child with whom she has a distant relationship (exchange), so on a priori grounds it would be difficult to 
predict this particular pattern. 
The one anomaly in table 5 concerns our measure of children’s financial need.  When we 
compare mothers for whom the coefficient of variation in children’s predicted income is above and below 
the (bequest sample) median, we find the two groups are equally likely to provide an altruistic motive.
18  
The logit estimates in tables 2 and 4 reveal this variable to be positively correlated with the probability 
that the mother intends unequal bequests. We now find it is uncorrelated with the probability that the 
mother explains her intentions in a manner that we classify as altruism. However, as we noted earlier, the 
exchange model also predicts a potential relationship between transfers and within-family variation in 
child income, although it does not predict whether high or low-income children receive greater transfers. 
Table 5 shows that mothers with high-variation children have a slightly greater tendency than others to 
report an exchange motive. It is possible that the expected relationship is obscured by the interplay of 
both altruistic and exchange-related motives.   
The evidence presented here tells a consistent story: relatively few mothers intend to differentiate 
among their children in making bequests, but those who do appear to be driven by both altruism and 
exchange motives. The biological status of the children is also key but, as we have discussed, only 16% 
of mothers have nonbiological children, and among those mothers the desire to favor biological children 
may reflect altruism, exchange, or evolutionary motives. 
5. Inter vivos transfers 
While relatively few parents divide their estates unequally among their children, researchers consistently 
find that the vast majority of parents who make inter vivos transfers give unequal amounts. Respondents 
in the NLS report information on transfers made to their children in the last year, so we can follow up our 
analysis of bequests with a similar investigation of inter vivos transfers.  In doing so, we assess whether 
patterns in the NLS data are similar to those found in other data sets, and we address several more 
substantive questions.  First, do the same observable proxies for altruistic, exchange, and evolutionary 
motives (poor health, having nonbiological children, etc.) that predict the probability of unequal bequests 
also predict the probability of unequal transfers?  Second, do mothers who intend unequal bequests also 
                                                 
18 Even when we use a more extreme breakdown coefficient of variation of children’s income in the top quartile 
versus the bottom three quartiles we find little difference in the percentage of mothers expressing an altruistic 
motive.   17
make unequal inter vivos transfers?  Third, do mothers who self-report altruistic, exchange, and 
evolutionary motives for their bequest decisions differ in their likelihood of making unequal inter vivos 
transfers? From a theoretical perspective, it is not clear how patterns of inter vivos transfers and intended 
bequests should be related. On one hand, we expect mothers to exhibit consistent behavior over time:  
whether they are motivated by altruism, exchange, or evolution, their propensity to treat their children 
differently should be independent of when the transfer is made.  On the other hand, a mother may achieve 
her desired allocation of resources by making unequal transfers during her lifetime and revert to equal 
giving for bequests. 
To address these issues, we use the “transfers sample” described in section 3.  This sample 
contains the subset of mothers in the bequest sample who answer a series of questions about transfers 
made to their children in the last 12 months and who report having made transfers.  For up to five 
individual children, mothers report the dollar amounts they (and their husbands) lent to the child (and 
his/her spouse),
 gave as cash, gave as gifts, and gave as “other financial assistance”;
  there is no minimum 
amount for a transfer to be counted. We add the transfer amounts made in all categories to get the total 
transfer to each child.   Among the 855 mothers in the transfer sample, the mean transfer amount per child 
is $1,980 (with a standard error of 144) and the median is $500. 
Our first task is to determine how mothers allocate inter vivos transfers among their children.  
Table 6 reveals that 17.7% of the 855 mothers give exactly the same dollar amounts to each (in-sample) 
child.  Another 7.8% differentiate among their children, but give amounts that are all within 20% of the 
within-family mean.  The remaining 75% of mothers have even more variation in their inter vivos 
transfers.   Table 6 also reveals that 70% of mothers make a positive transfer to each of their children, so 
it is not the case that unequal transfers arise only when a mother gives gifts or money to one child but not 
another.  In the remainder of our analysis, we use a strict definition of unequal transfers and count as 
unequal the 82.3% of mothers who do not give exactly equal transfers to each child.  Our results do not 
change significantly if we move the 7.8% falling within the 20% band from the unequal category to the 
equal category.  
In table 7 we present logit estimates of the probability that a mother makes unequal inter vivos 
transfers.  In specification 1, the explanatory variables are identical to the ones used to examine unequal 
intended bequests (tables 2 and 4).  When we use this specification the estimated coefficients for several 
variables are qualitatively similar to what we found for the probability of unequal bequests:  Mothers’ 
income, assets, home ownership, and schooling continue to have insignificant effects.  The estimated 
coefficients for “poor health” and “some children have children” continue to be positive, although in   18
contrast to the table 2 estimates they are no longer statistically significant.  The coefficient of variation of 
children’s income is positively and significantly associated with the probability of intending unequal 
transfers, just as it is with the probability of unequal bequests. 
Table 7 also reveals a number of estimates for specification 1 that differ from what we saw for 
bequests.  First, in table 7 we see that younger mothers (who have younger children, on average) are 
considerably more likely than older mothers to make unequal transfers to their children; when it comes to 
bequests, older mothers are the most likely to favor unequal allocations.  Second, while the presence of 
stepchildren and adopted children are both strongly, positively associated with the probability of unequal 
bequests, table 7 reveals both to be less important determinants of transfer allocations.  The probability 
that mothers with stepchildren make unequal transfers is 13 percentage points higher than the probability 
for mothers with no nonbiological children, but this amounts to only a 16% change in the unconditional 
probability of 82.3%.  The presence of an adopted child has virtually no effect on the probability of 
unequal transfers.
19  Third, mothers with coresident children are far more likely than others to make 
unequal transfers; this difference does not appear when we examine the probability of unequal bequests. 
Although the logit model is silent on which children are receiving the larger transfers, a closer look at the 
data reveals that the average transfer to coresident children is roughly 30% larger than the average 
transfer to non-coresident children.  This evidence is consistent with coresident children being relatively 
needy and mothers altruistically providing them with cash transfers in addition to housing. (If this 
neediness is transitory it would not necessarily affect the distribution of bequests, which may be many 
years away.)  It is also consistent with exchange if coresident children tend to help their mothers more—
however, the estimated coefficient for the “receives help from children” indicator is statistically 
insignificant in specification 1, and remains virtually unchanged when we drop the “coresident” variable 
from the model.  
In table 8, we use the transfers sample to assess the unconditional relationship between unequal 
giving with respect to bequests and inter vivos transfers.  Table 8 shows that the majority of mothers 
(77% of the sample) make unequal inter vivos transfers and intend to make equal bequests.  Other data 
sources have revealed these two patterns of giving to be the norm, so we would be very surprised if they 
were not revealed in our data.  Only 16 mothers (2% of the sample) choose the reverse combination of 
unequal bequests and equal inter vivos transfers.  What is noteworthy about the numbers in table 8 is that 
although the sample sizes are small, it appear that mothers who intend to make unequal bequests make 
                                                 
19 As we noted earlier, stepchildren are more likely than adopted children to have other parents who can provide 
them with resources. Therefore, this differential behavior on the part of mothers could reflect altruistic motives 
rather than an evolutionary desire to advance their genes.   19
equal transfers at a higher rate than other mothers.  The 61 mothers in the unequal bequests category are, 
of course, far more likely than other mothers to be “consistent” in their transfer behavior:  74% of them 
not only intend to make unequal bequests, but actually make unequal transfers.  However, the remaining 
26% make equal transfers, which is a higher rate than the 17% seen for the rest of the sample.   
To learn more about the temporal consistency of mothers’ transfer behavior, we examine the 
conditional relationship between intended unequal bequests and actual unequal transfers by reestimating 
the logistic regression of table 7 after including a dummy variable indicating whether the mother intends 
to divide her estate unequally. The results appear as specification 2 in table 7.  This addition has little 
effect on the estimated coefficients for the other covariates, but it is clear that, ceteris paribus, mothers 
who intend to make unequal bequests are less likely than other mothers to make unequal inter vivos 
transfers.  The estimated coefficient for “unequal bequests” is –0.938 and statistically significant; mothers 
in this category are 8.5 percentage points less likely to distribute cash, gifts, and loans unequally among 
their children.  This finding is consistent with the unconditional pattern seen in table 8. 
In summary, we find that observed proxies for altruistic, exchange and evolutionary giving (“has 
stepchildren,” the coefficient of variation of children’s income, etc.) generally affect the probability of 
unequal  inter vivos transfers the same way they affect the probability of intended unequal bequests.   
However, mothers who intend to make unequal bequests do not always make unequal transfers.   Whether 
we condition on observed characteristics or not, we find that these mothers are somewhat less likely than 
the remaining sample members to make unequal transfers. 
6. Concluding remarks 
Researchers have been frustrated in their efforts to understand the motives behind intra-family transfers. 
Available data have been extensively analyzed, but have failed to provide conclusive support for models 
of altruism, exchange, or evolution.  Our contribution is to use new data for a sample of 45-80 year-old 
mothers who participate in the National Longitudinal Surveys of Young Women and Mature Women.   
These data include a feature not available in other surveys:  verbatim explanations for why mothers intend 
to divide their estates unequally among their children. 
Our analysis of the verbatim responses suggests that a variety of motives come into play when 
mothers establish their wills.  Among mothers who intend to divide their estates unequally among their 
children, 25% provide explanations that are consistent with altruism and another 25% give reasons 
suggesting they intend to exchange bequests for child-provided services. Fewer than one in five mothers 
has nonbiological children, yet 10% of mothers refer to stepchildren or adopted children in their response.    20
(Among mothers with a nonbiological child, roughly one in three falls into this category.)  We term these 
responses “evolutionary,” although mothers who favor their biological children may be motivated by 
altruism or exchange rather than genetic links.  Another 20% of mothers give reasons suggesting that, in 
fact, they intend an equal distribution of their estate, and the remaining 20% of mothers remain 
unclassified because their explanations do not reveal their motives.  Based on mothers’ own explanations 
for their decisions to treat their children unequally, it appears that altruism and exchange are equally 
prominent motives.  
When we bring characteristics of mothers and their children into the analysis, the evidence 
continues to point to a variety of motives for mother-to-child transfers.  Such factors as poor maternal 
health, the presence of nonbiological children, and increased within-family variation in children’s 
predicted income are associated with a higher probability of intended unequal bequests.  These patterns 
are consistent with altruistic, exchange, and evolutionary motives for unequal giving—a conclusion that is 
strengthened by our finding that, for example, mothers in poor health are more likely than others to give 
an exchange-related explanation for their intended unequal bequests.  
By comparing mothers’ actual divisions of inter vivos transfers with their intended bequests, we 
find that relatively few mothers appear to adhere to the same patterns over time.  In our data, more than 
three out of four mothers distribute inter vivos transfers unequally among their children while intending to 
make equal bequests.  We also find that the relatively small subset of mothers who intend to make 
unequal bequests are more likely than other mothers to make equal inter vivos transfers.  Both findings 
confirm the widely-accepted view that parents behave differently when making inter vivos transfers and 
bequests. 
The patterns seen in our data indicate that the operative motive for parent-to-child transfer 
decisions likely varies across parents and over time for a given parent.  The finding that each competing 
model—altruism, exchange, and evolution—plays a potentially important empirical role has practical as 
well as theoretical interest.   After all, the extent to which income inequality changes across generations is 
very much dependent on whether parents favor their low-income children when transferring resources.  
Similarly, the ability of intra-family transfers to offset or crowd-out government spending depends on 
whether families are altruistic.  To address these long-standing policy issues, we do not need a single, 
“correct” theoretrical model.  Instead, we need additional evidence on when and for whom the alternative 
motives drive intra-family transfer decisions.   21
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Table 1:  Summary Statistics for Selected Mother-Specific Variables  
Full sample  Bequest sample  Transfers sample 
Variables  Mean S.E.    Mean S.E. Mean S.E. 
Financial status          
Family income ($1,000s)  35.82  .69  41.30  1.14  49.04  1.72 
(median)   (20.33)   (25.38)   (31.11)   
Family assets ($10,000s)  22.55  .91  33.21  1.36  39.20  2.10 
(median)  (9.76)   (18.75)   (22.85)   
1 if own home  .81    .92    .93   
Highest grade completed  12.32  .05  13.05  .06  13.37  .08 
Demographics           
Age  60.34 .17 62.04 .24 61.25 .33 
1 if white
  .76  .89   .91   
1 if married  .62    .70    .70   
1 if widowed  .19    .18    .17   
1 if divorced  18    .12    .13   
1 if never married  .02    .00    .00   
Health status           
1 if in poor/fair health  .27    .20    .19   
1 if receives help from child(ren)  .37    .37    .44   
Child variables           
Number of children  3.68  .03  3.39  .04  3.12  .05 
1 if has only boys  .13    .14    .15   
1 if has only girls  .13    .15    .16   
1 if has both boys and girls  .74    .71    .69   
Number of biological children  3.30  .03  3.04  .04  2.81  .04 
1 if has only biological child(ren)  .83    .84    .84   
1 if has step child(ren)  .14    .13    .11   
1 if has adopted child(ren)  .03  .04   .05   
Number of coresident children  .39  .01  .31  .01  .38  .02 
1 if has coresident child(ren)  .30    .24    .28   
Number of grandchildren  5.09  .09  4.46  .11  3.77  .14 
1 if has grandchild(ren)  .84    .81    .78   
1 if some children have child(ren)  .55    .51    .50   
1 if all children have child(ren)  .30    .30    .28   
Coeff. of within-family variation for 
children’s predicted income  
33.43 .37 41.30  1.14 31.97 .70 
Number of mothers  3,491  1,618  855 
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Table 2:  Logit Estimates of the Probability that a Mother  
Intends to Divide her Estate Unequally Among her Children   
Variable   Coeff.  S.E.  Marg. 
effect 
Intercept  -3.733 .539   
Family income ($1000s)
  .004 .002 .000 
Family assets ($10000s)  -.000  .002  -.000 
1 if owns home  -.051  .338  -.003 
1 if highest grade completed<12  .249  .286  .014 
highest grade =13-15  .274  .243  .015 
highest grade =16+  -.210  .286  -.014 
1 if age=45-54  .116  .293  .007 
age=65-74  .150 .281 .009 
age=75+  .384 .398 .020 
1 if nonwhite  .193  .289  .011 
1 if widowed  .229  .267  .013 
divorced  .431 .312 .022 
1 if in poor/fair health  .379 .230 .020 
1 if receives help from child(ren)  -.190  .239  -.013 
Number of children
  -.078 .066  -.005 
1 if has both boys and girls  .117 .234 .007 
1 if has stepchild(ren)  1.005 .254 .041 
1 if has adopted child(ren)  .910 .351 .038 
1 if has coresident child(ren)  .079 .264 .005 
1 if some children have child(ren)   .334 .200 .018 
Coefficient of variation for children’s 
predicted income
 
.017 .005 .001 
Log likelihood  -417.482   
Number of observations  1,618   
Number (percent) with unequal=1  128 (7.9%)   
Note:  Estimated coefficients in bold face are statistically different than 
zero at a 10% significance level.  Marginal effects are computed at the 
sample mean.  
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 Table 3:  Examples of Reasons for Intended Unequal Bequests   
Verbatim response  No. of cases 
Altruism 33 
Refer to children’s needs  (22) 
e.g., Oldest son has more assets than youngest son;   
        Daughter will be living in house and needs it.   
Refer to children in group home and/or with disability  (11) 
e.g., Daughter can’t have over $2000 or she’ll lose her state benefits.   
Exchange 33 
Refer to quality of relationship with children  (17) 
e.g., Because we are estranged from our daughter;   
.      Some of them don’t know how to act.   
Refer to children caring for or contributing to mother  (8) 
e.g., Have gotten more from two children than from the third;   
        XXX will be the executor;   
       XXX takes care of me.   
Refer to children’s contribution to house, farm or business  (8) 
e.g., Leaving more to son who helped build and maintain the property;   
       Farm goes to son who is working on the farm now.   
Evolutionary 13 
Refer to plan to favor biological children and/or disfavor stepchildren  (13) 
e.g., Will be divided between biological children;   
       Not leaving anything to stepchildren;   
       Because XXX is really not our child.   
Equal division  25 
Refer to inclusion of nonchildren in will
a (13) 
e.g., Grandchildren are sharing;   
       Will be divided equally between XXX  and children.   
Refer to intentions to favor minor children  (4) 
e.g., One child is a minor.   
Other references to dividing estate equally  (8) 
e.g., My husband first, then my children.   
Reason unclassified  24 
Describe intended division without explanation  (16) 
e.g., Just one son gets it all;   
       XXX will not receive anything.   
Other unclassified responses  (8) 
e.g.,  Nobody’s business why;   
       Not very much after bills are paid.   
Note:  These are verbatim responses (paraphrased for brevity) to the question:  Why will your 
estate not be divided equally among your children?  It is asked of 128 respondents with more 
than one child who report that they (a) have a will, (b) intend to leave something to their 
children, and (c) intend not to divide their estate equally among their children.    
a7 of the 13 cases refer exclusively to grandchildren.  Grandchildren are also referred to in 3 
responses classified under exchange and one response classified as altruism.    26
Table 4:  Logit Estimates of the Probability that a Mother 
Intends to Divide her Estate Unequally Among her Children 
(using alternative definitions of “unequal” based on verbatim responses)    
Definition 1
a  Definition 2
a 
Variable   Coeff. S.E. Marg. 
effect 
Coeff. S.E. Marg. 
effect 
Intercept  -4.271 .599   -3.891 .570   
Family income ($1000s)
  .003  .003 .000 .002  .003 .000 
Family  assets  ($10,000s)  .001  .002 .000 .001  .002 .000 
1 if owns home  -.149  .354  -.008  -.074  .352  -.004 
1 if highest grade completed<12  .234  .301  .010  .322  .289  .015 
highest  grade  =13-15  .149  .267 .007 .259  .253 .012 
highest grade =16+  -.625 .351  -.039  -.515 .328  -.035 
1  if  age=45-54  .248  .347 .010 .224  .320 .011 
age=65-74  .448  .324 .017 .270  .302 .013 
age=75+  .786 .429  .026  .559 .413  .023 
1  if  nonwhite  .088  .322 .004 .156  .304 .008 
1  if  widowed  .349  .281 .014 .212  .275 .010 
divorced  .470 .352  .018  .326 .338  .015 
1 if in poor/fair health  .318  .252  .013  .334  .241  .016 
1 if receives help from child(ren)  -.213  .266  -.011  -.138  .251  -.008 
Number of children
  -.061  .069 -.003 -.081  .068 -.004 
1 if has both boys and girls  .394  .275 .016 .253  .253 .012 
1 if has stepchild(ren)  .941  .278 .030 .958  .267 .034 
1 if has adopted child(ren)  .977  .380 .030 .948  .365 .034 
1 if has coresident child(ren)  .167  .290 .007 .025  .280 .001 
1 if some children have child(ren)   .411  .233 .016 .437  .221 .020 
Coefficient of variation for 
children’s predicted income
 
.015  .005 .001 .015  .005 .001 
Log likelihood   -354.174  -383.342 
Number of observations  1,618  1,618 
Number (percent) with unequal=1  103 (6.4%)  114 (7.0%) 
aIn definition 1, a mother is classified as intending unequal bequests if she (a) reports that she intends to 
divide her estate unequally among her children and (b) gives a reason that does not suggest that equal 
division is her true intent.  In definition 2, we reclassify as “unequal” 11 mothers whose reason for 
intending unequal bequests is that they plan to give more to a minor child (n=4) or include 
grandchildren in their will (n=7).  See text for details.  
Note:  Estimated coefficients in bold face are statistically different than zero at a 10% significance 
level.  Marginal effects are computed at the sample mean. 
   27
Table 5:  Distribution of Reasons for Intended Unequal Bequests,  
 by Selected Characteristics  
(sample is mothers who intend to divide their estates unequally)  
  
    Reason for intended unequal bequest     












All mothers  103  .32  .32  .13  .23     
1 if highest grade completed=16+  12  .25  .50  .17  .08 
highest grade completed<16  91  .33  .30  .12  .25 
3.06 .383
b 
1 if age=75+  13  .23  .38  .15  .23 
age<75 99  .33  .31  .12  .23 
0.66 .884
b 
1 if married  64  .31  .30  .16  .23 
widowed or divorced  39  .33  .36  .08  .23 
1.53 .674 
1 if in poor/fair health  29  .21  .45  .10  .24 
not in poor/fair health  74  .36  .27  .14  .23 
3.86 .277 
1 if receives care from children  37  .35  .41  .03  .22 
receives no care from children  66  .30  .27  .18  .24 
6.05 .109 
1 if number of children≤4 81  .36  .33  .09  .22 
number of children>4  22  .18  .27  .27  .27 
6.82 .078 
1 if all children are biological  68  .44  .34  0  .22 
have step/adopted children  35  .09  .29  .37  .26 
34.70 .001 
1 if some children have children  67  .33  .36  .12  .19 
all/no children have children  36  .31  .25  .14  .31 
2.21 .529
 
1 if c.v. for kids’ inc. ≤ median  38  .34  .29  .05  .32 
 c.v. for kids’ inc. > median  65  .31  .34  .17  .18 
4.62 .202 
aχ
2 statistic for a test of the null hypothesis that the distribution of reported reasons is the same for each 
pair of independent subsamples.   
bExpected frequencies for some cells are less than five. 
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Table 6: Percent of Mothers Making No Inter Vivos Transfers,  
Equal Transfers, and Unequal Transfers  
 Percent 
 Equal transfers to all children   17.7 
 Unequal transfers, but within 20% of family mean for all children    7.8 
 Other unequal transfers  74.5 
 —— 
 100.0 
Percent making transfers to all children  70.3 
Number of mothers   855 
Note:  mothers are asked whether they (and their husbands) lent money, gave 
money, gave gifts, and provided other financial assistance to each child (and 
his/her spouse) in the last 12 months; those who answer “yes” for any category are 
asked the amount given.  We add the transfer amounts made in all categories to 
get a transfer amount for each child. 
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Table 7:  Logit Estimates of the Probability that a Mother Made Unequal 
 Inter Vivos Transfers to Each of Her Children in the Past Year    
  Specification 1  Specification 2 
Variable  Coeff. S.E. Marg. 
effect 
Coeff. S.E. Marg. 
effect 
Intercept  1.563 .600    1.526 .605   
1  if  age=45-54  .043  .314 .006 .070 .316 .009 
age=65-74  -.684 .282 -.069 -.667  .282 -.067 
age=75+  -.618 .297 -.065 -.594 .398  -.061 
1  if  nonwhite  .348  .390 .051 .378 .394 .055 
1  if  widowed  .169  .274 .023 .198 .276 .027 
Divorced  .088  .326 .012 .104 .328 .014 
1 if highest grade completed<12  -.276  .318  -.032  -.273  .320  -.032 
highest  grade  =13-15  .102  .252 .014 .117 .254 .015 
highest  grade  =16+  -.036 .247 -.005 -.076  .248 -.009 
Family income ($1000s)
  -.001 .002 -.000 -.001  .002 -.000 
Family assets ($10,000s)
a  .000  .002 .000 .000 .002 .000 
1 if owns home  -.353  .423  -.040  -.412  .427  -.045 
1 if in poor/fair health  .193  .266  .027  .218  .268  .030 
1 if receives help from child(ren)  .253  .225  .036  .238  .225  .033 
Number of children
  -.130 .079 -.017 -.108 .081  -.014 
1 if has only both boys and girls  .130  .208 .018 .147 .209 .020 
1 if has stepchild(ren)  .800  .396 .134    .986 .411 .171 
1 if has adopted child(ren)  -.093 .448 -.012 -.020  .451 -.003 
1 if has coresident child(ren)  .829  .286 .140 .837 .286 .140 
1 if some children have child(ren)   .208  .200 .029 .221 .202 .030 
Coefficient of variation for 
children’s predicted income
 
.015  .005 .002 .017 .005 .002 
1 if unequal bequests (def’n 1)       -.938  .345 -.085 
Log likelihood  -369.258  -363.038 
Number of observations  855  855 
Number (percent) with unequal=1  704 (82.3%)  704 (82.3%) 
Note:  Estimated coefficients in bold face are statistically different than zero at a 10% significance 
level.  Marginal effects are computed at the sample mean.   30
Table 8:  Number of Mothers With Equal Intended Bequests 
and Equal Inter Vivos Transfers  
  Inter Vivos Transfers 
Bequests  Equal Unequal  All 
Equal  135 659 794 
Pct. of row total  17.0  83.0  100.0 
Pct. of sample  15.8  77.1  92.9 
Unequal  16 45 61 
Pct. of row total  26.2  73.8  100.0 
Pct. of sample  1.9  5.3  7.1 
All  151 704 855 
Pct. of sample  17.7  82.3  100.0 
Note:  Based on “definition 1” of unequal bequests (see table 4). 
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Appendix 








Number of women interviewed in 1999  2,467  2,900  5,367 
No children in child roster   -349  -520  -869 
 ——       
Number of mothers  2,118  2,380  4,498 
Number of children  [7,721]  [6,551]  [14,272] 
Fewer than two children age 18 or older   -281  -726  -1,007 
 ——  ——  —— 
Number of mothers in baseline sample  1,837  1,654  3,491 
Number of children age 18 or older  [7,415]  [5,018]  [12,433] 
Existence of will unknown  -59  -52  -111 
Report having no will  -744  -938  -1,682 
Plan to leave nothing to children, or plan unknown  -33  -27  -60 
Do not report intended division of estate  -17  -3  -20 
 ——  ——  —— 
Number of mothers in bequest sample  984  634  1,618 
Number of children age 18 or older  [3,612]  [1,880]  [5,492] 
Inter vivos transfer amount missing for all children  -292  -160  -452 
Make no transfers to any children  -211  -100  -311 
 ——  ——  —— 
Number of mothers in inter vivos transfer sample  481  374  855 
Number of children age 18 or older  [2,279]  [1,352]  [3,631] 
Number of children with transfer data  [1,509]  [964]  [2,473] 
 
 